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NONPROFITABILITY AS A DEFENSE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH MINIMUM HOUSING CODES
City of St. Louis v. Brune, 466 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971)
Defendant, an owner of rental property, was convicted and fined for
noncompliance with a St. Louis "hot bath" ordinance requiring every
dwelling unit to have a tub or shower bath connected to hot and cold
water.1 Conceding a violation, defendant contended that the statutory
requirement operated to deprive him of property without due process
of law. The trial court excluded evidence that the building involved
had been operated at a loss the previous year; that the building's worth
after improvements would be less than the cost of installation of im-
provements; that the property would be unrentable at a price that would
compensate the landowner for the expenditure; that the neighborhood
was filled with vacant, unrentable property which had been extensively
vandalized; that certain property in the same neighborhood had become
unrentable after installation of similar improvements and had been sub-
sequently vandalized; that tubs and showers were not absolute neces-
sities, but mere conveniences for the use of the tenants; and that basic
cleanliness could be maintained by use of soap and water in a kitchen
sink.2  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri held: the evidence
was relevant and material to the due process issues involved, and re-
manded the case.3
Minimum housing codes are one tool presently employed by cities
in an attempt to insure safe dwellings and to prevent further deteriora-
tion of slum areas. Although housing codes date back to the turn of
the century,4 widespread adoption of these codes has occurred only re-
1. ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE § 391.040 (1963), states: "Every dwelling unit
shall have a tub or shower in good working condition, properly connected to ap-
proved hot and cold water and sewer systems in the toilet room or in a separate room
adjacent to such dwelling unit."
2. City of St. Louis v. Brune, 466 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Mo. 1971).
3. Id.
4. L. FRIEDMAN, GoVERNMENT AND SLUM HousING, chs. 1-3 (1968); Mandelker,
HouSING CODES, BUILDING DEMOLITION AND JUST COMPENSATION: A RATIONALE FOR
TIE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER OVER SLUM HOUSING, 67 MICIt. L. REv. 635,
636 (1967) (hereinafter cited as MANDELKER).
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cently, stimulated by federal legislation requiring proof of a "workable
program of community improvement"' as a condition to receipt of
federal funds for urban renewal through slum clearance and develop-
ment of low income housing." These codes are directed at facilitating
improvement in three general areas: 1) installation and upkeep of ad-
equate facilities;7 2) density of occupancy;" 3) proper levels of main-
tenance and cleanliness." Courts have upheld these laws as valid ex-
ercises of the police power,10 which are reasonably related to the public
health," safety,12 and welfare."
5. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) asamended (Supp. 1972).
6. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1969) further provides that:
"In entering into any contract for advances for surveys, plans, and other preliminary
work ... the secretary shall give consideration to the extent to which appropriate local
public bodies have undertaken positive programs (through the adoption, moderniza-
tions, administration, and enforcement of housing, zoning, building and other local
laws, codes and regulations relating to land use and adequate standards of health,
sanitation, and safety for buildings, including the use and occupancy of dwellings) for
(1) preventing the spread or recurrence in the community of slums and blighted
areas.. ." See D. HUGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw
385-86 (1971).
7. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE §§ 391.000, 391.110, 391.130 (1963).
See generally Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1115, 1116-17 (1956).
8. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE § 391.120 (1963). See generally Note,
Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1115, 1116-17 (1956).
9. See, e.g., ST. Louis, Mo., REv. CODE, § 391.100 (1963). See generally
Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HAv. L. REv. 1115, 1116-17 (1956).
10. Wheat v. Ramsey, 284 Ala. 295, 224 So. 2d 649 (1969); Apple v. Denver, 154
Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964); State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 234, 229 A.2d 552
(Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1966); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960);
Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 297 Md. 104, 113 A.2d 899 (1955); Paquette v.
Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959); Richards v. Columbia, 227 S.C.
538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); Boden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156
(1959). But see Safer v. Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
11. Courts have shown great deference to public health measures, realizing that a
city need not wait until an epidemic strikes to act. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 548 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting); Wheat v. Ramsey, 284 Ala. 295, 224 So. 2d
649 (1969); State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 234, 229 A.2d 559 (Cit. Ct. App. Div.
1966); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960); Givner v.
Comm'r of Health, 297 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955); Paquette v. Fall River,
338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1969); Richards v. Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d
683 (1955). But see Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1970).
12. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 548 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) (a report paralleling
the location of substandard housing and juvenile delinquency accepted into evidence.)
13. Courts, in supporting minimum housing codes, have based their decisions on:
a city's power over urban renewal within the concept of general welfare, State v. Schaf-
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Application of minimum housing standards to older existing build-
ings may require a property owner to bear expenses for renovation. 14
Forcing expenditures upon the property owner does not automatically
constitute a taking without due process of law, however, because all
property is held subject to a valid exercise of the police power. 15 The
question is whether the legislation is reasonably related to public health,
safety, and welfare. In determining reasonableness, the economic im-
position on the landowners must be weighed against the governmental
interest sought to be protected and the extent to which the legislation
actually effectuates that interest."6
When minimum housing codes deal with such areas as fire protec-
tion, density of occupancy, and sanitation there is an obvious direct re-
lation to public well-being. 17  Even substantial renovation costs will
not cause such code provisions to be found unreasonable. s Notwith-
fel, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 4, 229 A.2d 559 (Cir. CL App. Div. 1966); City of Louisville v.
Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960); the good order of the city, Boden v. Milwaukee,
8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959); the general spirit of the inhabitants, City of
Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960); the prevention of depreciation of
property values, Boden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wisc. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 165 (1959).
14. See note 10 supra. See also St. Louis v. Warren Comm'n & Inv. Co., 226
Mo. 148, 126 S.W.2d 166 (1910); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1117. These authorities also
hold that there is no merit to the argument that the Housing statute should not apply to
buildings built before the passage of the statute.
15. See, e.g., note 10 supra. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 592 (1962). "If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render
it unconstitutional." Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1945); Home
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blarsdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hutchinson v. Valdosta,
227 U.S. 303 (1913).
16. See cases cited notes 10, 11, 15 supra.
17. Courts have traditionally treated ordinances with these aims as paramount
exercises of the police power. Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 188 N.E.2d
700, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 8 (1963); Abbate Bros., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill.
2d 337, 142 N.E.2d 691 (1957); City of Chicago v. Washington Nursing Home, 289 111.
206, 124 N.E. 416 (1919); St. Louis v. Hoevel Real Estate & Bldg. Co., 59 S.W.2d 617
(Mo. 1933); St. Louis v. Nash, 260 S.W. 985 (Mo. 1924); St. Louis v. Warren Comm'n
& Inv. Co., 227 Mo. 148, 126 S.W. 166 (1910); Vorhof Constr. Co. v. Black Jack,
454 S.W.2d 588 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1970).
18. Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700, appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 8 (1963); Abbatte Bros., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 13 Ill. 2d 337, 142 N.E.2d
691 (1957); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1960); Adamec v.
Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937); Hinckley v. City of Seattle, 40 Wash.
468, 82 P.2d 747 (1905). Cf. Wheat v. Ramsey, 284 Ala. 295, 224 So. 2d 649
(1969). But see Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
Dente v. Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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standing the economic burden to the property owner, courts find it un-
safe to live where less than these minimum conditions exist and conse-
quently require compliance.
Not all items in a minimum housing code have a readily foreseeable
health and safety justification. Provisions requiring window and door
screens, 19 front door peepholes, 20 white washing,21 minimum ceiling
heights,22 and hot baths or showers23 have a less obvious relation to
public well-being. It is in dealing with these kind of code provisions
that evidence of substantial installation costs and evidence of the provi-
sion's relationship to public well-being is essential to a due process
challenge. In Brune, the trial court's exclusion of evidence on these
points denied the landowners any defense for non-compliance.24 On
remand, if the trial court determines that installation of a tub or shower
in each dwelling unit is essential for the health and safety of the occu-
pants, the ordinance should be held a valid exercise of the police power
and compliance required. If, however, installation is found to have
only a tenuous relation to the actual health and safety of the occupants
the trial court should weigh several factors in determining whether
compliance amounts to a taking of property without due process. Not
19. See, e.g., St. Louis, Mo. REV. Code § 391.110 (1963). MANDELKER, supra
note 4, at 668 n. 145 (1967).
20. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 4, at 668 n. 145 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wisc. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1960).
ST. Louis, Mo., REV. CODE § 391.100(E)(F) (1963).
22. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., MuNICIPAL HOUSING CODE, art. 631; Apple v. City of
Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964). ST. Louis, Mo. REV. CODE § 391.090(A)
(1963).
23. Because of the high cost of plumbing and installation, hot bath ordinances have
been the single most litigated item in municipal housing codes. The Supreme Courts
of Alabama, Kentucky, and Massachusetts have upheld enforcement. Wheat v. Ramsey,
284 Ala. 295, 224 So. 2d 649 (1969); City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869
(Ky. 1960); Paquette v. Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959). Implicit in
these decisions is the judicial reluctance to overturn the legislative judgment that the
ordinance serves an appreciable benefit to public health. Three courts have held en-
forcement of a hot bath ordinance does constitute a violation of due process because
there is no appreciable public benefit. Personal cleanliness can be adequately main-
tained with a sponge and cold water. Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Dente v. Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S. 65 (S. Ct.
1966); Early Estates, Inc. v. Housing Bd. of Review, 93 R.I. 227, 174 A.2d 117 (1961).
24. In Missouri, the burden of factual rebuttal of the legislative determination is
placed upon the party challenging enforcement of the statute. Bellerive Inv. Co. v.
Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d 628 (1929); Vorhof Const. Co. v. Black Jack,
454 S.W.2d 588 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1970). See generally 1 ANTIEAu, MUNIcIPAL
COR'ORATION LAW § 5.17-.18 (1968).
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only is evidence of renovation costs relevant, but the court should also
consider the landowner's ability to realize a profit if forced to comply. 25
Courts appear to have avoided a direct discussion of the issue of
profitability in determining the reasonableness of muncipal housing or-
dinances.26 This avoidance is probably because there is inherent in
profitability much more than the actual cost of renovation. Such col-
lateral issues as vacancy rates, vandalism, availability of insurance,
probabilities of deprecation or appreciation of the land, the saleability
of the building, and the nature of high risk investment also must be
considered. It is a much simpler matter to compare renovation costs
to the value of the building or observe the cost per unit and determine
whether the costs are patently unreasonable.28  The obvious reality of
the profit motive, however, warrants judicial concern with the issue of
profitability.2 9 Renovation costs alone may not reflect the landowner's
actual hardship. If profits are already at a minimal level, renovation
costs that do not appear excessive on their face may still cause hardship
25. The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C.
538, 88 S.E.2d 683, 694 (1955) did consider evidence relating to profitability in the
form of opinions from real estate agents and physicians. In Brune, the Supreme Court of
Missouri appears to have allowed for a much more exhaustive examination of all
factors that might affect profitability.
26. But cf. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683, 694 (1955).
27. In Brune, one must consider that the building in question is located in the
St. Louis waterfront slums. The area is full of empty buildings. There are currently
no buyers for the building if Brune decides, or is forced, to sell. The estimated
repair bill for installation of hot baths is $1,200 per unit or $7,200. The six fami-
lies pay $30-35 a month, and it is unlikely they would be willing or able to pay addi-
tional rent.
28. In assessing the reasonableness of housing codes by looking at the cost of
renovation, courts have compared costs to a building's market value. Adamee v. Post,
273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937) (holding $5000 reasonable when the building and
land valued at $13,000); to assessed value, Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1970) (holding expenditures of $20,000 unreasonable when as-
sessed value was $40,000); to cost per unit, City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.
2d 869 (Ky. 1960) ($800-$1000 per unit for hot baths held not to violate due process);
Dente v. Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (held,
indirectly, $1,000 per dwelling unit totalling $11,000 violated due process); Richards v.
City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) ($575-$750 per dwelling unit held
reasonable). See generally MM.JDELxER, supra note 4.
29. Because of the many considerations that might effect profitability, and
problems in determining what is a reasonable rate, courts probably consider the matter
is better left to a legislative determination. Profitability is not an unfamiliar area for
the legislature, evidenced, for example, by utility rate making. As long as the legisla-
tures do not act, however, it hardly seems preferable for the courts to adopt a "head in
the sand" attitude.
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to the point of abandonment. On the other hand, even if renovation
costs are substantial, enforcement of an ordinance may not be unrea-
sonable. The actual hardship on the landowner may be slight. There
may be an appreciation in land value, tenants willing to pay additional
rent, or tax benefits to offset the present high cost of compliance.
Continued enforcement of municipal housing codes, where the codes
impose obligations of dubious benefit to public health or safety, without
examining profitability may damage rather than benefit the public.
Landowners who can no longer operate their rental property at a profit
because of the impossibility of recouping the cost of repair will elect
an obvious alternative-closing down the building. The effect will be
to evict the tenants into a housing market with an inadequate supply
of low-income units. Investors and private lending institutions are
already avoiding investment in city properties because of strict housing
code enforcement.3" Ignoring the issue of profitability may force the
landlord to give up his investment, which also means that the tenant
loses his place to live. Certainly this result was not intended by the
passage of housing codes. Nor should it be the consequence of narrow
judicial decisions.
30. St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 31, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
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